Marine Le Pen is looking to become the next President of France in 2027, and polling for next year’s presidential elections makes her the heavy favorite to win. A Le Pen victory would be an earthquake in Europe and could have dramatic consequences for the European Union.

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A likely confrontation between a future President Le Pen and Brussels, the EU’s main seat of power, could fundamentally reshape the bloc, as France is one of the largest and most powerful countries in the bloc, by population, economy, and military power.

In an interview with the Financial Times published on Wednesday, Le Pen outlined her plans to challenge the EU’s budget and institutional authority if she wins the 2027 presidential election. Her proposals include substantially cutting France’s financial contributions to Brussels and moving to limit the powers of the European Commission, the EU’s unelected executive.

The new statements are a break from her previous support for leaving the euro currency and holding a referendum on France’s EU membership. Rather than following the example of Brexit, Le Pen wants to challenge the EU from within at least over the short term, using France’s massive economic and political influence over the bloc to force concessions from its elites.

With nationalist and populist-right parties wielding increasing influence across Europe, a Le Pen presidency could unite what has historically been a fractured collection of Eurosceptic parties across the EU into a powerful lobby capable of obstructing the EU’s centralizing ambitions.

An Alternative to ‘Frexit.’

Le Pen’s opposition to European integration stretches back decades. Her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, built her National Rally (RN) party’s predecessor, Front National, into one of Europe’s most prominent nationalist movements, opposing the erosion of French sovereignty and the transfer of political authority to EU institutions. Marine Le Pen initially embraced a similarly confrontational approach. During her 2017 presidential campaign against Emmanuel Macron, she advocated abandoning the euro and renegotiating France’s relationship with the EU, with the possibility of a referendum on membership.

However, her defeat to Macron, partly attributed to public concerns over the economic consequences of leaving the single currency, prompted a strategic rethink. By the 2022 presidential election, Le Pen had backed away from Frexit, switching to advocating for a Europe of sovereign nations in which national governments would reclaim powers over immigration, borders, and economic policy from the EU.

The fundamental objective remained unchanged: reducing the authority of Brussels and restoring decision-making powers to national capitals.

Le Pen’s Long War.

Le Pen’s relationship with European institutions has been defined by confrontation, culminating in legal proceedings that threatened to derail her presidential ambitions. The issue centered on allegations that Le Pen and other officials in her party improperly used European Parliament funds intended for parliamentary assistants to finance political party operations.

French prosecutors pursued criminal proceedings. In March 2025, a French court convicted Le Pen of misappropriation of public funds and imposed a five-year ban on her holding elected office, initially threatening to exclude her from the 2027 presidential election.

Le Pen denounced the ruling as politically motivated, arguing that the French judiciary was effectively being used to prevent voters from electing one of the country’s most prominent opposition figures. Even some liberal commentators expressed misgivings about the ruling, noting that most establishment parties used their European Parliament funds in the same way without sanctions.

On July 7, 2026, a French appeals court upheld her conviction, but reduced the timeline of her electoral ban, leaving her eligible to contest the 2027 election. The court also imposed a sentence involving electronic monitoring, subject to further legal proceedings.

How France Could Grind the EU to a Halt.

Le Pen’s greatest weapon against Brussels is France’s position as one of the EU’s largest economies and biggest financial contributors. The EU depends on agreement between its member states for some of its most consequential decisions. According to the Council of the European Union, unanimity is required for the bloc’s long-term budget, its system of financing, EU enlargement, certain foreign policy decisions, and changes to important areas of taxation. France also possesses an effective veto over several major EU initiatives.

Brussels is also currently negotiating its 2028–2034 financial framework, with European governments divided over spending priorities and the proposed size of the budget. Le Pen reportedly wants to substantially reduce France’s EU contributions. She has also challenged efforts to finalize the next long-term budget before French voters go to the polls.

However, France cannot legally reduce its existing contributions on its own. Any major long-term restructuring of the EU’s financing arrangements would require negotiations with other member states. A Le Pen presidency could, however, withhold agreement on future financial frameworks, potentially forcing Brussels into difficult negotiations over its spending priorities and institutional powers.

A Populist-Nationalist Alliance?

Le Pen may find a growing number of allies who support her plans to regain national sovereignty from the EU. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has had her disagreements with Le Pen, particularly regarding Russia’s war with Ukraine, as Le Pen has called for an end to France’s financing of Ukraine while Meloni is a staunch supporter of President Volodymyr Zelensky. However, the Italian premier has expressed support for reforming the EU and giving more sovereignty to member states.

Meanwhile, Poland’s 2027 parliamentary election could potentially return the Eurosceptic Law and Justice (PiS) party to government, reopening the disputes over sovereignty and judicial authority with Brussels that characterized its previous administration. Other populist-right movements in Austria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic could provide additional allies, depending on electoral outcomes and coalition arrangements.

Under the EU’s qualified majority voting (QMV) rules, legislation normally requires support from at least 15 of the 27 EU member states, representing 65 percent of the bloc’s population. A blocking minority must generally contain at least four governments representing more than 35 percent of the population. France, Italy, and Poland, joined by another substantial member state or a wider coalition, could therefore frustrate legislation that does not require unanimity.

The Historical Record.

The EU establishment has previously demonstrated its willingness to confront and push back against the involvement of populist parties in member state governments. In 2000, Austria faced coordinated diplomatic measures from the then-14 other EU member states after Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party (FPOe) entered a governing coalition with the center-right People’s Party.

The measures included restrictions on bilateral political contacts and diplomatic cooperation. Although they were imposed by national governments rather than by EU institutions, they established a precedent for European leaders seeking to isolate an elected government over ideological differences.

More recently, Brussels has employed financial and legal mechanisms against Hungary and Poland. Under former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary faced the suspension of billions of euros in EU funding over various disputes over immigration and other issues. Poland’s former Law and Justice government similarly clashed with the European Commission over judicial reforms, culminating in Article 7 proceedings and disputes over European funding.

However, confronting France would present an entirely different challenge, with it being an EU founder member with a substantially larger population and economy than those three countries, and more political leverage than Italy.

The Best Hope for a Return to Sovereignty.

The European Commission’s core powers are established in EU treaties. Fundamentally reducing those powers technically requires treaty amendments and ratification by member states. A populist-nationalist coalition would also need to move beyond simply blocking legislation toward agreeing on an alternative institutional framework.

The emergence of a powerful bloc of Eurosceptic governments could fundamentally change how the EU operates, even without formally dismantling its institutions. Le Pen’s emerging strategy presents Brussels with a significant challenge: a founding member too big to bully and sanction.

For decades, European integration has largely proceeded on the assumption that national governments would gradually surrender more and more authority to Brussels. A Le Pen presidency could test whether that process can be reversed, and whether the European Union can survive politically if one of its most powerful members decides that national sovereignty must come first.

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British Conservative (Tory) Party leader Kemi Badenoch has been rebuked by the White House after she attacked Reform UK party leader Nigel Farage over recent comments about the Chagos Islands, with a senior official accusing her of spreading “fake news” and undermining the British-American alliance. The rebuke is a major public embarrassment for the gaffe-prone party leader, who has a long history of peddling half-truths and outright deceptions.

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The Chagos Debacle.

The Chagos row began after Farage said in an interview that, if he was Prime Minister, he would have offered President Trump guaranteed use of the Diego Garcia base—the strategically vital joint British-American facility in the British Indian Ocean Territory, or Chagos Islands—in “perpetuity,” while pressing the American leader to stop counter-signaling Britain on the Falkland Islands, a British territory in the South Atlantic claimed by Argentina. Badenoch responded by calling the remarks “humiliating” for Britain and declaring that “giving away British territory in return for someone keeping quiet is not a deal.”

A senior White House official pushed back sharply. “At no point did anyone in the administration construe Nigel’s comments as suggesting that he was giving away the Chagos Islands. He was obviously referring to the use of the Diego Garcia military base, which is critical to countering threats from China and Iran,” the official said. “Anyone claiming otherwise is peddling fake news and undermining the Anglo-American relationship, including, apparently, Conservative Party leader Kemi Badenoch.”

A second US official adds:

“At no point did anyone in the administration construe Nigel’s comments as suggesting that he was giving away the Chagos Islands.

“He was obviously referring to the use of the Diego Garcia military base, which is critical to countering threats from…

— Harry Cole (@MrHarryCole) October 14, 2026

Currently, Britain’s incumbent Labour Party government is attempting to surrender the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, a China-aligned state with no real claim to the archipelago, in deference to a non-binding ruling of the United Nations’ International Court of Justice. The deal would involve Britain paying Mauritius to maintain a lease on Diego Garcia, which it currently owns outright for free, but security on the base would still be undermined by the possibility of Mauritius allowing China or another power to establish a presence on one of the archipelago’s other islands. Significantly, the negotiations to surrender the islands were initiated by Badenoch’s Conservatives.

Badenoch’s misrepresentation of Farage, who has doggedly opposed transferring the islands to Mauritian sovereignty and was instrumental in prompting the U.S. to intervene against the deal, fits a broader pattern: she has repeatedly faced accusations of exaggeration, selective memory, and inconsistency on her personal story, her record in government, and her current policies.

Championing DEI.

As Equalities Minister when the Conservatives were still in government, Badenoch led the so-called ‘Inclusive Britain’ framework that included work on ethnicity pay gaps in the National Health Service (NHS) and other diversity-related measures, such as pushing for increased racial diversity in the judiciary and law enforcement. She now claims to be a sharp critic of DEI schemes in opposition.

Farage has called her “totally disingenuous” on the subject, arguing that she should be judged by what happened under her ministerial watch rather than her current rhetoric.

The European Convention on Human Rights.

Badenoch previously insisted that leaving the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which binds Britain to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, would not be a “silver bullet” for immigration control. She now claims she would leave the ECHR, which is regularly used to block the deportation of illegal migrants and foreign criminals on highly dubious human rights grounds, but critics have stressed that the Conservatives had 14 years in government from 2010 to 2024 to do so, and that the promise is likely false, similar to its broken promises to substantially reduce immigration.

More broadly, her time in previous Conservative governments ties her to the party’s record of overseeing unprecedented mass migration, which she now claims ministers “didn’t notice,”  corporation tax increases, net zero energy policies, and incomplete delivery of Brexit.

🚨 Statement from Misley Mandarin, First Minister of the Chagossian Government. pic.twitter.com/iSm47N8zDg

— Reform UK (@reformparty_uk) October 14, 2026

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Hypocrisy on Identity.

At the Conservatives’ recent annual party conference, Badenoch took aim at Reform figures, including former colleague Suella Braverman, for suggesting English people have an ethnic identity. She mischaracterized this as a “debate whether my mixed-race children are English” and framed such discussions as divisive, racist identity politics.

Yet Badenoch has previously been explicit about her own pride in her ethnic identity. “I find it interesting that everybody defines me as being Nigerian. I identify less with the country than with the specific ethnicity [Yoruba]. That’s what I really am.” She added that she has “nothing in common with the people from the north of the country… those were our ethnic enemies.”

Critics, including Nigerians, have noted the double standard of resisting any suggestion of an English ethnic identity while asserting an exclusive Yoruba ethnic identity.

Exaggerated Childhood Hardship.

Badenoch has described a difficult upbringing in Nigeria marked by fear, corruption, and material hardship, including claims of limited access to clean water and other struggles. Nigerian officials, media, and people familiar with her family have pushed back. Her father was a family doctor who owned a private clinic serving wealthier clients; her mother held a prominent academic role; and she attended the elite private International School Lagos.

Nigerian officials have publicly accused her of being “someone who has obviously lied about everything she said about her upbringing in Nigeria,” with the Nigerian Vice President personally rebuking her for “denigrating her nation of origin.”

Badenoch has also faced criticism for a profile on her website claiming she was “a bright child, excelling at maths and English, who loved beating boys in her class at chess, at seven winning a national girls’ chess tournament.” It was subsequently revealed that she was one of only two girls who competed.

Born In a Muslim Country? 

While attempting to appeal to Muslim voters in April, Badenoch stated on LBC Radio, “My grandmother was a Muslim. I was born in a country that was 50 percent Muslim. I said Muslim prayers on Friday because that’s what happened there when I was at school. I have good friends who are Muslim.”

Badenoch was referring to Nigeria, where she was raised. Officially, however, she was born in London, not Nigeria, in 1980, after her mother flew there specifically to give birth. Because of this, Badenoch was entitled to birthright citizenship in the United Kingdom, even though her parents took her back to Nigeria shortly afterward. She did not return to Britain until she was 16. Significantly, the rules governing birthright citizenship were tightened shortly after she was born, meaning she would not have been eligible for citizenship today.

The Stanford Fantasy.

Badenoch has long claimed that at age 16 she received an offer and partial scholarship to study medicine or “pre-med” at Stanford University on the basis of strong SAT scores, but her family could not afford it. Former Stanford admissions staff, including the officer responsible for international admissions and financial aid at the time, have described this as implausible or even impossible.

Stanford does not offer an undergraduate pre-med degree. Admissions were not made on test scores alone, and partial scholarships of the kind described were not standard practice. Nevertheless, Badenoch has stood by her recollection, while insisting she cannot prove it because she no longer has the paperwork.

Melonigate.

Prior to the public takedown by the Trump administration for her misleading comments about Farage and the Chagos Islands, the most significant foreign policy disaster of Badenoch’s tenure centered on Italy, and an apparently invented conversation between the Conservative leader and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.

 The Times, Britain’s de facto newspaper of record, reported in August that Meloni had advised Badenoch not to countenance an electoral pact with Reform, urging her to “be your own woman and stand your ground. Shortly afterward, however, sources close to Meloni told The National Pulse that no such discussion took place, with Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party stating publicly that she never suggested that Badenoch should not consider allying with Farage.

The incident became a major scandal for The Times, which had to gut the story with extensive stealth edits, but did not indicate the changes in an editor’s note or issue a correction or contraction. If the false claim came from Badenoch’s team, it likely substantially burned the Conservatives’ credibility with the paper.

Is Walter Kemi “crashing out?”

Between her scholarship claims, her reverse ferret on immigration and net zero, her falling out with VP Vance, and now her retraction of this Meloni story, it appears so.

My appearance on GB News tonight: pic.twitter.com/W6Pj7YYJIM

— Raheem J. Kassam (@RaheemKassam) August 26, 2026

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New data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reveal a dramatic decline in the number of young American teenagers identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual, raising questions about whether a cultural phenomenon that expanded rapidly over the past two decades has reached a turning point.

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According to the research, the proportion of ninth-grade girls identifying as lesbian or bisexual fell from 30 percent in 2021 to just 17 percent in 2025, an overall decline of 43 percent. The percentage identifying specifically as bisexual was cut in half, falling from 26 percent to 13 percent over the same period. Jean Twenge, a psychology professor at San Diego State University who analyzed the CDC figures, described the decline as a “free fall.”

The figures emerge amid other developments challenging assumptions about younger generations across the West, including increased support for populist-right parties among sections of Europe’s youth and an unexpected surge in young people converting to Catholicism in colleges across the country, suggesting that the progressive cultural consensus that shaped much of the 2010s has begun to lose its influence over the next generation.

LGBT Ideology Became Mainstream.

By the early 21st century, the LGBT movement had achieved several major legal victories in the U.S., culminating in the 2015 Supreme Court decision recognizing same-sex marriage nationwide. The following decade saw LGBT ideology become increasingly promoted in schools, universities, major corporations, entertainment, and political institutions. Pride campaigns exploded into the mainstream, while discussions of gender identity and sexual orientation became commonplace, especially among young people.

According to Gallup’s historical polling, just 3.5 percent of American adults identified as LGBT in 2012. That figure rose to 7.1 percent in 2021 and reached 9.3 percent in 2024. Among Generation Z adults, the numbers were enormous, with 23.1 percent identifying as LGBT in 2024.

The Post-Pandemic Reversal.

The CDC data examined by Professor Twenge indicate that the most dramatic changes have occurred among younger teenage girls, particularly those identifying as bisexual. The proportion of ninth-grade girls identifying as lesbian or bisexual declined by 13 percent between 2021 and 2025. Among high school girls overall, the proportion identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual declined from approximately 27 percent in 2021 to 22 percent in 2025.

The pattern was notably different among boys, whose identification rates have remained mostly the same. Older teenage girls also experienced much smaller changes, with their identification rates remaining above pre-pandemic levels. The findings raise questions about the massive growth in bisexual identification among teenage girls during and immediately following the COVID-19 pandemic.

Conservatives have pointed to changing political attitudes and opposition to progressive gender policies as possible explanations. Terry Schilling, president of the American Principles Project, responded to the figures by crediting changes under President Donald J. Trump’s administration.

Meanwhile, Gallup reported that adult LGBT identification declined slightly to nine percent in 2025, compared with 9.3 percent in 2024.

The Battle Over Gender Ideology in Schools.

Many young people are shaped by their education, and the ongoing battles by parents and lawmakers over gender ideology may also be playing a part in the decline of young people identifying as LGBT.

Conservative parents and advocacy organizations have challenged school policies permitting students to adopt different names or pronouns without parental notification, the inclusion of gender identity concepts in classroom materials, and the participation of transgender students in sex-segregated sports.

These disputes have increasingly shaped state legislation, school-board elections, and national education policy. In January 2025, President Trump signed an executive order titled “Ending Radical Indoctrination in K-12 Schooling”.

The order directed federal agencies to develop strategies for eliminating federal support for certain gender identity and DEI-related programs in schools, while strengthening enforcement of existing parental rights protections. It specifically addressed school policies involving the social transition of minors without parental involvement.

The Trump administration subsequently directed the Department of Education to ensure federal education funding complied with its interpretation of federal anti-discrimination law and policies concerning gender identity.

The Decline of Woke.

The latest teenage identification figures do not establish that homosexuality is declining or that LGBT identities are disappearing from American society. Gallup’s adult figures remain more than twice their 2012 level, while the sharpest teenage decline is concentrated among younger girls rather than appearing uniformly across all demographic groups.

However, the changing figures coincide with a significant transformation in the institutional environment surrounding progressive social policies.

Major corporations that once enthusiastically embraced gender ideology and woke DEI initiatives are retreating from some of those commitments. Public schools face mounting disputes over gender ideology and parental authority. The Trump administration has made reversing progressive identity-based policies a central feature of its domestic agenda.

The figures suggest that the rapid growth in sexual-identity labeling among younger teenagers during the early 2020s was not necessarily permanent and may have just been a passing trend.

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The murder of three young British girls in Southport, England, in July 2024 prompted Angela Rayner, then Deputy Prime Minister, now Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, to announce a £15 million “Community Recovery Fund.” The money was meant to be for areas hit by the riots that followed the stabbing spree, perpetrated by the son of two African asylum seekers. Instead, portions of it reached the Ella Baker School of Organising, a far-left network founded by former Hope Not Hate activists, for training that targeted Nigel Farage, his Reform UK party, and even the establishment Conservatives.

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Where the Money Went.

Rayner launched the fund after the attack in which Axel Rudakubana murdered Alice da Silva Aguiar, Bebe King, and Elsie Dot Stancombe, and wounded several others. In her announcement, she claimed communities had “so quickly came together” and that the money would help them “rebuild.” Guidance limited spending to immediate recovery, preventing further disorder, and bringing people together.

Labour-led municipal governments allocated it differently. Birmingham City Council handed the School of Organising an initial £13,450 for a pilot program called “Defeating narratives of division,” an 11-part lecture series plus a manifesto. Blackpool’s Labour council added £9,000 for a local version. Sessions ran for staff in Sheffield, run by Labour and the even farther-left Greens, Walsall, Solihull, and the Liverpool City Region, including Sefton, which covers Southport. Further sessions were planned, including with a Welsh government-linked youth training body.

The partisan thrust of the training was clear, with an online booking form for Glasgow training stating: “Despite the abject failure of the mainstream democratic parties, there is still time to avert the impending disaster of a Reform UK government.”

Taxpayer-Funded Propaganda.

Documents seen by The Telegraph show the training singled out right-wing politicians, including Farage, Suella Braverman, a former Conservative Cabinet minister who is now a Member of Parliament for Reform, and former Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson. It even criticized then-Labour Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer for warning that Britain was becoming an “island of strangers” due to uncontrolled mass migration under the Conservatives, calling the speech “shameful.”

The manifesto called Farage “a classic authoritarian populist” and listed him among figures “undermining democracy.” Lecture material said Reform was “hostile to multiculturalism, hostile to LGBTQ+ rights, opposes ‘woke’ in the classroom, wants out of the European Convention of Human Rights, and will rip up our already limited climate change commitments.”

One lecture warned that “our people (the working classes) are voting Reform UK in the belief that migrants are the problem” and that “toxic forces are asserting a narrative that prioritises the interests of straight, white, men.” It cited the alleged “vulnerability of working class communities to far-Right, alt-Right and Tory-Right narratives of division and blame.” The “far-Right” was defined to include elements of the largely center-left Conservative Party “and beyond.”

Trainees were told to counter “racist narratives,” including the true observation that migrants strain underfunded services and drive down wages. They were instructed to form local groups and recruit “committed activists.” Citing the communist theorist Antonio Gramsci, lectures suggested undermining public beliefs that many asylum seekers are “bogus” or that certain migrant groups fail to assimilate.

Suppressing Anti-Immigration Sentiment.

An entire lecture covered opposing anti-immigration protests through counter-demonstrations, social media, and slogans. Role-playing exercises asked trainees to plan responses in a declining seaside town where local papers had begun reporting petty crimes by migrants and publishing negative editorials about their presence. Another scenario involved a run-down estate with scarce social housing where “racists” argued that council housing should go to British nationals and local people. A third exercise concerned an election in a small town where candidates opposed preferential housing for refugees, falling school standards linked to children with English as a second language, and public grants to ethnic minority groups.

The materials praised Hope Not Hate and also outlined how to pressure a council to call for a Gaza ceasefire by identifying the most useful community figures.

The Group’s Background.

The Ella Baker School of Organising was established by former members of the far-left Hope Not Hate. That organization was reported to the Electoral Commission in June 2026 over alleged campaigning for Labour in the Makerfield by-election. Public funding for the School’s materials came after applications to councils for shares of the Recovery Fund. The fund’s supposed aims were to “reduce the risk of further disorder” after the 2024 riots and “promote cohesion between communities.”

The Broader Pattern.

A government spokesman insisted: “Councils are not permitted to use taxpayers’ money to fund partisan issues or party-political activity. Councils must make sure money is spent in line with their responsibilities, and we have powers in place to recoup money if it is found to have been misspent.” The relevant government department also tried to shift blame by stressing that councils, not the Secretary of State, made the local awards, and that Birmingham and Blackpool chose to give the School of Organising roughly £13,000 and £9,000 respectively.

Nevertheless, training sessions explicitly aimed at stopping working-class communities from moving right on immigration questions, paid for with money allocated after the murder of three girls by the son of two Rwandan asylum seekers admitted to Britain for unclear reasons, raise serious questions about state manipulation of the public discourse and suppression of the public’s legitimate grievances over decades of lax immigration policy.

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Voters across the European Union face a dense run of national and regional contests over the next twelve months. The results could shift the balance of power within the bloc, with governments less willing to tolerate open border policies, green mandates, and open-ended military support positioned to gain substantial influence. Populist-nationalist and softer center-right parties are entering several of these races with strong polling positions, following years of voter frustration with migration surges, energy costs, and centralized mismanagement by EU officials in Brussels.

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The Starting Gun.

Bulgaria holds its presidential election on October 25th, 2026. President Iliana Yotova, backed by Prime Minister Rumen Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria movement, leads the field by a wide margin in recent surveys. Radev’s parliamentary victory earlier this year already changed the unsung but regionally influential country’s posture, halting further donations of weapons from Bulgarian army stocks to Ukraine after 13 aid packages on the grounds that the country had reached its limit and the war must be settled by negotiation, not military means alone.

A Yotova victory would lock in that preference for a negotiated settlement over continued arms shipments to Kiev, giving war hawk voices less weight in EU foreign policy.

Spain.

Spain will vote on November 29th, 2026, after Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called a snap election. Multiple polls put the center-right People’s Party in the low-to-mid 30s and populist-nationalist Vox near 19 percent, enough in most seat projections for the two parties to clear an absolute majority together.

Sánchez’s Socialist Workers’ Party has faced sustained criticism for pushing an amnesty for hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants, with many more coming forward to be regularized than the government initially projected. The Socialists’ mishandling of subsequent mass migrant crossings into Ceuta, a Spanish city a few miles across from the country’s mainland on the coast of North Africa, has drawn further criticism. Tens of thousands of migrants overwhelmed the Spanish exclave in a short period, reinforcing arguments from the PP and Vox that border control is in a state of collapse.

A PP-Vox government would mark the first national-level inclusion of a major populist-nationalist party in government since Spain’s democratic transition, and would likely tighten migration rules.

France.

The first round of France’s presidential election falls on April 18th, 2027. Marine Le Pen of the National Rally (RN) party leads first-round surveys, often in the mid-30 percent range. A substantial share of voters already rate her as competent for the presidency. In September, National Rally president Jordan Bardella signed a memorandum of understanding with Nigel Farage’s Reform UK party at the latter’s conference. The document commits both sides, if in power, to intercept migrant boats in the English Channel and return their passengers to France pending ultimate repatriation to their countries of origin. It also calls for shared costs and tighter controls on illegal working and welfare access.

A Le Pen presidency would place a longstanding critic of open borders at the head of a founding EU member and radically alter discussions on migration returns and EU integration.

🚨NEW: Nigel Farage and the likely next Prime Minister of France, Jordan Bardella, sign a 'Memorandum of Understanding' which pledges to stop the illegal migrant crossings and includes allowing the UK to tow boats back to France pic.twitter.com/VY1cYv3NkF

— GB Politics (@GBPolitcs) September 4, 2026

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Italy.

Italy must hold parliamentary elections by December 2027. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy) continues to lead individual-party polls near 27 percent.

Some on the right, including President Trump, have voiced misgivings about the surprisingly slow pace of change under Meloni and her apparent willingness to court the EU establishment since she took office, but her government has begun to record some qualified results in reducing seaborne migration after an initially poor performance. Official figures show sharp drops compared with 2023 levels, with repatriations rising and the ratio of returns to arrivals improving markedly.

Deals with Tunisia and Libya, reinforced border measures, and a potentially trend-setting offshore processing center in Albania have contributed to these results, giving Meloni a record she can point to with her base even as newer populist formations test her right flank.

Poland.

Poland’s parliamentary election is due by autumn 2027. Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition leads individual polls, yet the combined strength of the formerly governing Law and Justice party (PiS), the populist-nationalist Konfederacja (Confederation), and related national-conservative lists remains substantial enough that cooperation among them could produce a right-leaning coalition government in several projections.

Importantly, the right already holds the Polish presidency. In June 2025, Karol Nawrocki, the nationalist candidate backed by Law and Justice, narrowly defeated liberal Warsaw mayor Rafał Trzaskowski. Nawrocki campaigned on sovereignty, opposition to elements of the green agenda, and limits on further EU integration. While he lacks the powers of an American or French president, with the government reporting largely to Prime Minister Tusk, his victory has already constrained the Tusk government’s room to maneuver, given his ability to veto liberal legislation. A stronger parliamentary result for the right in 2027 would likely orient the country further away from permissive immigration policies, climate politics, and a relaxed attitude towards migration.

Other Countries to Watch.

Germany holds multiple state elections in 2027. The eurosceptic, anti-mass migration Alternative for Germany (AfD) party leads national polls in the high 20s and has recently posted decisive results in eastern states, including winning nearly 44 percent in Saxony-Anhalt. Germany’s establishment parties have responded by renewing discussion on potentially banning the populist party.

Estonia votes on March 7th, 2027. The national-conservative Isamaa has frequently led or placed near the top. Finland’s election on April 18th sees the populist Finns Party competitive within the governing center-right coalition, although the Social Democrats lead some surveys. Greece is expected to vote by late July, where Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s center-right New Democracy holds a clear lead.

Slovakia’s contest, due by late September, pits Robert Fico’s Smer-SD against progressive opponents in a close race. Fico has questioned the automatic invocation of NATO’s Article 5, resumed military attaché contacts with Russia, and opposed EU financial packages for Kiev that he argues will prolong the war in Ukraine, instead pushing for negotiations. A Fico victory would strengthen voices favoring diplomatic off-ramps with Russia over prolonged military escalation.

Taken together, the raft of upcoming European elections gives populist-nationalists and softer conservatives who are increasingly open to cooperating with them many openings to expand their influence. Where they succeed, national governments are likely to prioritize border security, energy realism, and de-escalation with Russia. In particular, their cumulative effect could produce a European Union more attentive to public majorities that have already registered preferences for tighter immigration controls in recent national votes.

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Image by Sébastien Bertrand.

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